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Art, Terrorism and the Negative Sublime
  Arnold Berleant 
Abstract
The range of the aesthetic has expanded to cover not only a
wider range of objects and situations of daily life but also to
encompass the negative. This includes terrorism, whose
aesthetic impact is central to its use as a political tactic. The
complex of positive and negative aesthetic values in terrorism
are explored, introducing the concept of the sublime as a
negative category to illuminate the analysis and the distinctive
aesthetic of terrorism.
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“In due time, the theory of aesthetics will have to
account not only for the delight in Kantian beauty
and the sublime, but for the phenomena like
aesthetic violence and the aestheticization of
violence, of aesthetic abuse and intrusion, the
blunting of sensibility, its perversion, and its
poisoning.” [1]
1. Terrorism and Aesthetics
It has become increasingly clear that the arts, and the
aesthetic, more generally, occupy no hallowed ground but live
on the everyday earth of our lives. Recognition is growing that
the aesthetic is a pervasive dimension of the objects and
activities of daily life. [2] Perceptual experiences that possess
the characteristics of aesthetic appreciation are marked by an
intense, focused sensibility we enjoy for its intrinsic perceptual
satisfaction. We typically have such experiences with works of
art and with nature, but they are equally possible in other
occasions and with other kinds of objects. Such experiences
engage us in an intensely sensory field in which we participate
wholly and without reservation, as we customarily do with
works of art. The objects and occasions, however, may be
ordinary ones, such as eating, hanging laundry, engaging in
social relations, or operating a perfectly functioning automobile
or other mechanism. The range of such occasions is limitless,
and this adds to the significance of the aesthetics of the
everyday.
Such an expansion of the aesthetic has important
consequences. Perhaps the most striking is the need to
acknowledge that the range of aesthetic experience includes
more than the appreciative engagement with art and nature.
But not only does the aesthetic extend to the uncustomary but
it encompasses the full range of human normative experience.
Experiences of the aesthetic include not only the elevated and
noble but the reprehensible, degrading, and destructive. This
is so not as the result of an arbitrary decision to include them
but from actual experience and practice. The aesthetic offers a
full and direct grasp of the human world. That it may include
violence and depravity is not the fault of aesthetics but of that
world.
A salient symptom of that world is terrorism. Its wanton
violence and uncontrolled destruction are appalling. But easy
moral outrage offers no understanding, and only by grasping
the meanings and significance of terrorism can we hope to
deal with it effectively. Let me begin with the Happening, for
the Happening can provide a forceful illumination of the
aesthetic of terrorism.
Not that Happenings took negative form. A syncretic, visual-
theatrical artistic development of the1960s, Happenings were
a deliberate artistic innovation intent on transgressing all the
hard boundaries that protected the arts and made them safe.
In Happenings audiences became the performers, no clearly
circumscribed object could be identified as the work of art,
aesthetic distance was relinquished to the active engagement
of the audience, artistic genres were fused into unrecognizable
combinations and, most significantly, the boundary between
art and life disappeared. Happenings were often playful, even
festive occasions that danced over the pieties of conventional
artistic axioms.
Some commentators quickly recognized that the importance of
the Happening lay beyond its iconoclasm and entertainment
value. One of them was Regis Debray, a young French radical
intellectual, who "regarded a revolution as a coordinated series
of guerrilla Happenings. Some of his admirers, in fact, took
part in Happenings as training for future Happenings when
they would use guns and grenades." [3] What many had
considered a bizarre exaggeration following the dismissal of
traditional artistic forms turns out to have been an uncanny
pre-vision of the world half a century later. The net of
terrorism in which the world is now enmeshed is all-enclosing.
But how can terrorism be considered in the same sense as
art? The question itself seems outrageous.
Happenings made a radical break from the aesthetic tradition
by denying that art occupies its own exclusive realm separate
from the world outside. Yet it was not only Happenings that
rejected this tradition; many other artistic developments in the
twentieth century deliberately crossed that boundary. The
presumptive difference between the world of art and the world
of daily life lies at the source of such perennial problems in
aesthetics as the status of truth and illusion in art, the moral
effects of art works, and the nature of artistic representation.
Such continuing issues, all of which can be traced back to
Plato, find in artistic autonomy the domain of human freedom,
as Kant had claimed. [4] Yet at the same time it is an
autonomy that, by philosophic decree, vitiates the force of the
arts and ignores their power.
The tradition of restricting and removing art from the world of
daily life dates from Plato’s suspicion that the arts can have a
morally degenerating influence. Expressed most famously in
The Republic, it led him to advocate strict controls on the use
of the arts in education and to propose censorship. [5] This, of
course, was related to Plato’s mistrust of sense experience,
which he considered the source of illusion and false belief.
These views were reinforced and enlarged by Kant, who
claimed early in the modern period that the autonomy of
judgments of taste is entirely independent of the existence of
the object of our satisfaction and is not bound up with
practical interest. [6]
The effect of these ideas on the history of philosophy has been
profound. Plato’s mistrust of the senses and artistic
independence and his failure to recognize the imaginative
contribution that the arts can make to education and moral
development joined with Kant’s denial of full aesthetic
satisfaction to the interests of daily life. Together they
functioned effectively to muzzle the power of the arts. Yet
once we recognize the active interplay that occurs between art
objects and activities and the world in which they exist, we
find vast new opportunities for power and influence.
The force inherent in this relation has not been lost on the
modern state. For philosophical aesthetics deliberately to
ignore the political potential and use of the arts is to hand that
power over to others whose values, standards, and behavior
are often ignorant, manipulative, and self-aggrandizing. The
traditional separation of aesthetics from daily life has freely
allowed the political appropriation, often the misappropriation,
of the arts. That is why governments practice “news
management” and other forms of censorship, why they “stage”
conferences, rallies, and other political events, why they
promote “official” art, and why they persecute artists who do
not conform to their purposes and destroy their works. Art is
dangerous, and Kant got it backwards when he placed morality
and art in separate domains.
In the interpenetration of art and the human world are the
grounds for a new aesthetic vision and the need to articulate
it. [7] When Happenings fused art with the everyday world,
they did so as art. But what about presumably non-art objects
that are directly perceived as art? There is, of course, "found
art," where an object is extrapolated from the everyday world,
segregated, and framed: a piece of driftwood, a bouquet of
field flowers, and, of course, the perennial urinal. Art is
claimed where none was intended. Some instances of found
art are benign, some provocative, others deliberately
inflammatory. They say nothing about the motives of those
who did the making and for whom the idea of art was
probably far from mind. What found art does do is center our
attention on an object or event in a way that resembles the
intense focus we give to things designated as art by an artist,
an institution, or the art world. Like Happenings, found art
places art squarely in the ordinary world. Can this apply to
acts of terrorism?
Some of the most striking claims of art for things outside the
art world were responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The
avant-garde composer Karlheinz Stockhausen called them "the
greatest work of art ever….the greatest work of art for the
whole cosmos," "a jump out of security, the everyday." And
the British artist Damien Hirst excluded art from all moral
judgment, arguing that the violence, horror, and death
associated with Ground Zero (the name given to the site of the
demolished New York World Trade Center) do not rule out the
possibility that film footage of the attack could be "visually
stunning" and resemble works of art. [8] Indeed, perceiving
that footage as art may be the ultimate act of framing.
Whether these events can be considered found art can be
debated but the label we give them is incidental. Of more
concern here is the claim that they are art or like art.
Attributing artistic achievement to the perpetrators may seem
revolting, but it would be arrogant and myopic to blithely
dismiss statements like Hirst’s and Stockhausen’s. For we must
take care not to confound the aesthetic with art or to consider
either of these necessarily positive. To call the film footage of
the attack visually stunning acknowledges their aesthetic
impact. Many art works could be described in similar terms but
yet reflect different content and moral meaning. Frederick
Edwin Church’s “The Icebergs” (1861) is visually stunning; so
are Turner’s “The Burning of the Houses of Lords and
Commons” (1834) and Mathias Grünewald’s “Crucifixion”
(1515).
But so also are many natural events: sunsets, the full moon in
the night sky, the sea in a great storm. But perceptual force
alone, while aesthetic, does not make art. It may lie in the
subject-matter of an art work but as part of the whole it is
something different. There is a sense in which Stockhausen’s
comment can be taken literally by regarding the 9/11 terrorist
attacks as theater. Stockhausen himself composed musical
works with dramatic venues and enormous scale, so his calling
the attacks “the biggest work of art there has ever been” was
not entirely unpredictable or out of character.
But how can we respond to these comments? Is it possible to
disentangle the aesthetic from the moral in such a highly
charged situation or does the moral issue entirely overpower
the aesthetic one? There are no unequivocal answers and
perhaps the consideration of Happenings, transgression, and
violence can help us make these assertions understandable.
They may suggest a way of grasping them that is not
immediately obvious. But first, however, is the matter of
terrorism, itself.
Simply to list the definitions of ‘terrorism’ would take pages.
What they have in common is the use of violence or the threat
of violence. [9] Most often added to the definition is that
terrorism focuses on a civilian population with the intention of
creating widespread fear, and that it is motivated by political
or ideological objectives. Terrorism also carries an element of
the unexpected. An element of chance enters into its choice (if
we may call it that) of victims and sometimes in the
determination of specific time and location, and this adds
greatly to the fear that acts of terrorism evoke.
It is interesting to consider that this combination of elements
that define terrorism – violence, civilian victims, fear – does
not specify the perpetrators. These may be indifferently radical
groups of the right or left, military, paramilitary,
governmental, or non-governmental organizations. The media
unquestionably play a central role in promoting such fear.
When fear-mongering is deliberate, the media that practice it
could themselves be considered terrorist organizations, just as
could other fomenting organizations, such as government
bureaus (what Badiou calls “bureaucratic terrorism” [10]) and
ad hoc groups of individuals who may be the perpetrators, as
in the Oklahoma City bombing. It is important to recognize the
scope of terrorism, since labeling organizations as ‘terrorist’
because they use or threaten violence toward a civilian
population, regardless of their place in the social order, is
revealing and sobering: they are not necessarily marginal.
Recognizing the wide range of sources of terrorism helps avoid
self-righteous exclusions.
It is important to realize that the use of terror is not confined
to Asia or the Middle East. Terror, in fact, has become a
standard practice at the present stage of world history.
Totalitarian states know well that terrorizing a population is
the most effective way of controlling it, far more potent than
overt force. We can recognize the climate of fear and terror
that has spread not only throughout regions in the African,
Asian, and South American continents; it is being deliberately
implemented in Western industrialized nations, as well, by the
use of so-called national security measures. Indeed, if state
terror were made visible, it would obscure the individual acts
of terror that have achieved such notoriety today. [11]
Acts of terrorism are appallingly inventive and their range is
extreme. They extend from suicide bombers in the Middle-East
and the release of the nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway by
the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo and its attempts at biological
terrorism to the 9/11 suicide plane crashes perpetrated by Al
Qaida. But we cannot exclude state terrorism in this portrayal:
the use of overt police action and military force to control
social activities, gangs dispatched to foment social violence,
and secret police to instill fear. And there is also the
increasingly sophisticated propagandistic use of the media—
magazines and newspapers, TV talk shows and news
broadcasts--to proliferate false information, obscure and
distort current events, and instill insecurity. This is no reign of
terror; we are living in an age of terror.
2. Can Terrorism Be Justified?
The scope of terrorism is, then, surprisingly large and its
definition surprisingly inclusive. At the same time it is
important to recognize the difference between terrorism and
terror and not to confuse the two. Terrorism is, as we have
seen, the calculated use of violence or threat of violence
against a civilian population with the intent of causing
widespread fear for political purposes. Terror, on the other
hand, is the overpowering emotion of intense fear. More about
this later. What I am concerned with just now is terrorism, not
terror, as such.
Can terrorism ever be justified? What makes terrorism so
morally appalling is that its victims are circumstantial,
uninvolved, and oblivious of what is happening. It is a vicious
lottery with equal opportunity to lose. The devastating results
of terrorist acts are not much different from the so-called
“collateral damage” suffered by civilian populations throughout
the whole history of warfare. Violence visited deliberately on
an innocent, circumstantial population condemns it as one of
the most heinous social wrongs, irrespective of any self-
justifying motives. For this reason terrorism can never be
vindicated, and terrorism practiced by a state is no more
exempt from moral condemnation than when used as a tactic
by a political or religious group.
But apart from the question of whether terrorism is ever
justifiable, it must nonetheless be recognized and understood.
Visible and bold acts of terrorism force us to acknowledge that
such acts of violence are not aberrations committed by
deluded individuals but social actions deliberately perpetrated
by groups and for clear reasons. They may be the arms of
state oppression or they may represent political opposition to
what is perceived as correlative injustice. Terrorist acts are
often committed in response to the social violence of
exploitation or oppression of one population group by another.
Yet one form of violence cannot be selectively justified over
against another. By being directed against unwitting victims,
all such actions are morally flawed. A violent act committed in
response to other acts of violence is not thereby exonerated:
both are equally condemnable. Can terrorism be considered
morally justifiable when it is the only available means to a
political or ideological end, when there is no alternative way to
redress an injustice? This is the critical moral question and
central to understanding terrorism.
The question of the justifiability of terrorism does not,
however, answer the aesthetic question: are aesthetic values
present in terrorist acts? Is there an aesthetics of terrorism?
What, indeed, has terrorism to do with aesthetics at all? It is
necessary to confront these questions because acts of
terrorism make effective use of the techniques and skills of art
and possess aesthetic force. Yet how can we speak of political
acts such as terrorism in the same breath as art and the
aesthetic? Must art that uses violence to convey a moral
message and make a moral judgment be condemned when
that message could not be made in any other way? We arrive
again at the same moral dilemma. This is a question that must
be faced by any argument for true democracy, the political
form that claims to provide means for peaceful social change.
[12] Democracy or terrorism?
The use of terrorism as a political act thus raises difficult
aesthetic as well as moral issues, and it is important to
understand terrorism, not just to condemn it. Indeed,
considering terrorism from an aesthetic vantage point can cast
considerable light on such acts. For these events are
perceptually powerful, engaging not only the visual but all the
senses. They are aesthetic because of their sensory force.
These are desperate acts committed in order to make a moral
and political statement through their aesthetic, that is, their
sensory impact. Moreover, their inherent political import is a
dramatic rejection of the traditional difference between art and
reality, a feature they have in common with the modern arts.
Since aesthetics centers on direct sensory perception, it is
clear that acts of terrorism have powerful aesthetic force. All
those who experience the effects of terrorism – its chance
victims, their relatives and associates, the organizations and
institutions that are damaged, the general public, the social
order – all can attest to its aesthetic impact. Human values –
and the value of humans – are at stake, but we cannot
measure such value quantitatively. How is it possible to
compare or judge experience? Is a physical act of terrorism
such as a suicide bombing worse than the repression of a
whole population by a government policy instituted in the
name of security, causing widespread fear and requiring overt
acts of brutality to enforce it? Is a deliberately planned riot
designed to manipulate a population less terrifying than, say,
an attempt to poison a public water supply? Here, I think,
differences in conditions, means, and consequences need to be
identified and each situation appraised on its own terms and
not by some general formula. At the same time and more
important, such alternatives are morally unacceptable as well
as rationally irresolvable. There is no choice between Hitler
and Pol Pot.
Unlike acts of sabotage, acts of terrorism have no direct
military target. Perhaps it can be said that in this respect they
mirror the largely self-contained character of art. And what
sort of aesthetic value can terrorism have? “[T]he tragic in
real life will necessarily have an aesthetic dimension as long as
the sensibility of the subject comes into play by judging
something as being ‘tragic’.” [13] Is there art in terrorism? It
cannot be denied that much of the political effectiveness of
terrorist acts comes from their carefully planned aesthetic
impact. Indeed, their effect is primarily, often spectacularly
theatrical. We can in fact say that such actions are deliberately
designed to be high drama. In this sense, then, is theater any
less appropriate a way to describe a spectacular act of
terrorism than it is to designate military activities? Perhaps it
now becomes understandable how an artist could consider a
terrorist act a work of art.
Can terrorism have positive moral value? Simple ascriptions of
positive and negative value no longer fit. Such morally
complex situations demand a different kind of analysis. If a
terrorist act contributes to achieving social justice, can we
even ask whether it is morally positive or negative? A Kantian
analysis would find it negative, for such actions cannot be
universalized. A utilitarian analysis would find it positive to the
extent it contributes to political or social reform, if it does
indeed have that consequence, rather than the redoubled use
of state terror. But can we even presume to balance
immediate pain, death, and destruction against future
benefits?
Neither of these analyses resolves the issue. Universalizability
is an ethical principle and a logical desideratum but it is not
axiomatic and exempt from critical reflection. And to consider
consequences only selectively is effectively to disregard their
wide-ranging fallout. Moreover, failing to acknowledge the full
scope of consequences continues the common practice of
hiding behind moral principles at human cost. Most important
is the further consideration that means and ends are never
separable. What kind of society can emerge from terror-
induced change? Though the intent of terrorist action may be
the goal of human liberation, the short-term effects are
unavoidably negative. And its long-term effects?
It is clear that the moral issues terrorism raises are complex.
In traditional terms the judgment may seem clear, but under
full consideration it becomes ambiguous. As in warfare where
everyone claims right, justice is on every side – and so, too, is
injustice. The pain of an enemy is no less great than one’s
own. Life lost is a lost life, no matter whose life it is.
Is a spectacular terrorist act aesthetically negative or positive?
It must be considered positive because of its dramatic force.
If, however, fear and terror overpower perceptual experience,
not only in its unwilling "participants" but also in its larger
"audience,” so that they feel in actual danger, a terrorist act
exceeds the possibility of aesthetic experience and so is
aesthetically negative. [14] So aesthetically, too, terrorism is
indeterminate. Such situations seem, then, to be ambiguous
both morally and aesthetically.
How a terrorist act can be morally positive in any sense may
be difficult to see. We must acknowledge that the strategy of
the acts and the motives of the actors may be guided by the
goals of liberation, of a more just social order, of an end to
oppression and exploitation, and other humane objectives. But
they may also be guided by the intent to preserve power and
the social and economic privileges that accompany it. Do any
ends ever justify terrorist means? Their morally reprehensible
effects are so blatant that it seems inconceivable that any
goal, however noble, could exonerate them. One cannot
choose between two incommensurable wrongs. At the same
time, even if a terrorist act could claim to be morally positive -
- which I do not believe is possible, does this justify its
aesthetic negativity? Morality and aesthetics are not easily
distinguished here. Pain and delight are both inherently moral
and aesthetic: The same act can be both morally and
aesthetically positive or negative, for the moral and the
aesthetic may be fully interdependent, inseparably fused. The
very perpetration of a terrorist act is at the same time both
aesthetic and moral, spectacularly destructive.
Generalities pale before the intense particularity of terrorist
acts. Every incident has its unique conditions and no logical
decision procedure seems possible. Does the sheer scope and
force of a terrorist act place it in a new and different category?
Just as we cannot measure aesthetic pleasure or grade works
of art, fear and terror are not truly quantifiable. Nor are
consequences fully determinable. And because both their
scope and their intensity cannot be specified precisely, they
are truly inconceivable. There is a concept in aesthetics that
denotes experience so overwhelming that it exceeds
comprehension -- the sublime, and it is worth considering
whether the sublime could conceivably be applied to acts of
terrorism.
3. The Negative Sublime
The sublime is a theory that reflects with great discernment on
a distinctive kind of aesthetic experience. While the sublime
became prominent in the eighteenth century as a key
dimension in the development of aesthetic theory, it has
become increasingly important in recent aesthetic discourse.
The starting point is usually Kant’s account, although Kant was
not the first to elaborate a theory of this distinctive mode of
aesthetic apprehension. Burke’s discussion of the sublime had
come half a century before, [15] and while Kant’s formulation
has dominated subsequent discussions, Burke’s observations
are particularly germane to the present one. For according to
Burke, the central feature of the sublime is terror. The most
powerful passion caused by the sublime in nature, he states, is
astonishment, a state of mind with an element of horror in
which all other thoughts are suspended. Fear at the prospect
of pain or danger freezes the capacity to reason and act and
evokes the overpowering feeling of terror. As “the strongest
emotion which the mind is capable of feeling,” Burke
maintained that the feeling of terror is a principal source of
the sublime: “[W]hatever is qualified to cause terror, is a
foundation capable of the sublime….” [16] And, “Indeed, terror
is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently the
ruling principle of the sublime.” [17] Burke described many
emotions associated with the sublime and the conditions under
which the sublime may be experienced, and he cited many
instances of terror incited by fear. His analysis, however, did
not proceed beyond such descriptions.
Kant, too, recognized fear as a feature of the dynamical
sublime. [18] In contrast with Burke, Kant developed an
elaborate theory illuminated by a distinction between
mathematical and dynamical sublime. In the first, the
magnitude of the absolutely great is a measure that the mind
cannot wholly encompass. [19] Applied to a terrorist act, its
effects and consequences cannot be fully described or even
mentally encompassed and are incommensurable. Its material
consequences in the form of physical destruction and social
disruption, the scope of the human anguish inflicted, and the
protective measures and reciprocal violence wreaked upon
society in reaction can never be fully enumerated. Its human
consequences are immeasurable because they are incalculable.
We may indeed say that we cannot quantify the destructive
force of a terrorist attack: it evokes the mathematical sublime.
The second, Kant's dynamical sublime, concerns the fear we
feel in response to the enormous might of nature, although we
must nonetheless feel secure and unthreatened, able to rise
above that fear and not be subject to it. Ironically, even war,
Kant avers, has something sublime in it if carried on with
order and respect for citizens' rights, [20] presumably by
protecting non-combatants. In the place of might in Kant's
dynamical sublime, the sublime in terrorism is present in the
intensity of physical force, in its engulfing emotional power, in
the overwhelming psychological pressure of the situation.
Like Kant’s dynamical sublime, the effectiveness of terrorism
lies in its potential threat to safety and in the very insecurity
and social instability that result. In terrorism safety is
especially equivocal: while there may be non-combatants,
everyone is vulnerable. The actual victims are but sacrificial
lambs for its effect on the larger population. Another important
difference is in the fact that, unlike the quantitative forms of
the Kantian sublime in which both magnitude and might (as
force) might seem to be measurable, the intensity of the
terrorist sublime is also immeasurable and its dimensions
indeterminate. And it rests on consequences that are
qualitatively indeterminable and thus incomparable. Only in
their circumstances and means are the acts and effects of
terrorism distinguishable. Since both the scope and the
intensity of terrorist attacks are beyond conception, both
morally and aesthetically, we need a new concept, the
"negative sublime," as their truest and most eloquent
identification.
Because acts of terrorism elude meaningful quantitative
determination, we must further acknowledge their moral and
aesthetic incommensurability, indeed, their very
inconceivability. Perhaps the only concept that can fully
categorize them is the negative sublime. Like the aesthetic,
the sublime is not necessarily a positive determination but a
mode of experience. Hence to call such acts of terrorism the
negative sublime is not an oxymoron but the recognition of
negativity whose enormity cannot be encompassed in either
magnitude or force. The uniqueness of such extreme actions
renders them capable of description only. One might claim that
an act of terrorism exemplifies the post-modern sublime as
Lyotard described it, in making the unpresentable perceptible.
[21] And because the moral and the aesthetic are inseparable
here, the negative sublime incurs equivalent aesthetic and
moral value. That the moral is also aesthetic makes it even
more intolerable. Death is the ultimate human loss, and body
counts and statistics are deceptively specific and impersonal.
Such qualitative consequences as the human suffering from
extreme acts of terrorism are beyond measure. "After the first
death, there is no other." [22]
Recognizing the aesthetic in acts of terrorism, even a positive
aesthetic, does not condone or justify such action, for in
terrorism the aesthetic never stands alone. Recognizing its
presence may help us understand the peculiar fascination that
the public has with such events of world theater. These are
indeed acts of high drama that fascinate us by their very
sublimity. [23] But the theatrical forcefulness that impresses
us with their image is indissolubly bound up with their moral
negativity, and identifying them as the negative sublime is to
condemn them beyond all measure. As an agent here in the
social sphere, art affects the world directly. Indeed, “by
attacking reality, art becomes reality.” [24]
Terrorism dramatically exposes the inseparability of the moral
and the aesthetic, yet it is an extreme form of what is always
the case. Utopian thought, to turn to the other side of the
normative ledger, also has a strong aesthetic component.
Utopianism is pervaded by moral values of social and
environmental harmony and fulfillment. Its goal of facilitating
living that is deeply satisfying through the fruitful exercise of
human capacities is as aesthetic as it is moral. To conform to
the tradition that separates the aesthetic from the moral
mirrors its segregation from everyday life and constricts its
force. Let us see the picture whole and not in parts.
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